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Executive summary 
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) has been engaged in capacity 
building and provision of technical support to the Afghan Ministry of Mines since 2007. A part of 
this engagement relates to the development of the Afghan Hydrocarbons Law, and 
commercialization of gas and oil reserves of the northern Jowzjan province through an international 
bidding process. 
 
The Terms of Reference request a conflict study in relation to oil and gas exploration in northern 
Afghanistan, including an assessment of the relations between the northern areas and the central 
administration, internal relations between northern based ethnic and military organisations and the 
role of regional actors. Income division between central and province authorities is to be examined, 
as is the view of local authorities on oil and gas extraction and ways to attract local interest; ways to 
secure greater focus on the gender dimension; the security situation and potential consequences for 
industrial development;    
 
This report is based on three primary sources of information. One is a literature review on issues 
relating to governance and income division of natural resources and potential for corruption in such 
management. The second is information on the security situation in Afghanistan in general and 
north Afghanistan in particular, and the process that is underway for exploring and utilizing Afghan 
and regional oil and gas resources. The third source is a series of semi structured interviews with a 
wide range of informant conducted in Kabul, Maymane, Saripul and Mazar-e Sharif. 
 
The literature review cover five main topics that were drawn upon in analysing the findings from 
Afghanistan: Structuring the management of natural resource revenues after conflict; how external 
interventions might positively influence existing post-conflict governance arrangements; should 
local solutions be prioritised over outside remedies; how availability of natural resources does affect 
corruption; and particular effects of natural resources on corruption in post-conflict settings. 
 
Afghan hydrocarbons resources are primarily located in northern Afghanistan. The first oil field 
was located in 1959 and the Soviet Union made extensive use of oil and gas resources from 1979 to 
1989. In addition to extensive exportation via pipelines to the Soviet Union, gas was distributed 
locally and transferred via a pipeline to a fertilizer factory in Mazar-e-Sharif. The resources were 
managed by the Afghan Gas Company, and a technical college was established in Sherbergan to 
educate and train technicians and staff. The area with hydrocarbon resources has for most of the 
recent period been under the control of the Uzbek leader General Dostum.    
 
Resource estimates for northern Afghanistan were released by the United States Geological Survey 
in 2006, and were of 1,596 million barrels of crude oil, 15,687 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 
562 million barrels of natural gas liquids. Most of the undiscovered crude oil is expected to be 
located in the Afghan-Tajik Basin, while most of the undiscovered natural gas is in the Amu Darya 
Basin where the present exploration is taking place 
 
The first Hydrocarbons Bidding Round in 2009, assisted by Norway, was for three blocks. The 
Jangalikalan Block: Jangalikalan (gas), the Juma-Bashikurd Block: Juma (gas), Bashikurd (gas), 
and the Kashkari Block: Kashkari (oil), Angoat (oil), Aqdarya (oil). Eleven companies registered 
interest but only one company submitted a bid that was rejected by the Government of Afghanistan 
(GoA) in April 2010.  
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There are a number of other energy transfer projects planned in the wider region where Afghanistan 
could act as a hub. An electrical transmission line has been constructed from Uzbekistan to Kabul, 
and there are plans for a new transmission line for electricity, termed CASA REM, from Central 
Asia through Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. Routing of electricity from Turkmenistan through 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan is in an early phase of exploration. The Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline 
(TAPI), aimed to bring natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and eventually India, has been 
under discussion since the mid 1990s. Pakistan and India pursued negotiations with Iran for the 
Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline (IPI), resulting in Pakistan signing an agreement with Iran in March 
2010. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has moreover announced an intention to 
develop regional energy projects. 
 
Afghanistan has a highly centralised governance structure: elected bodies such as the Parliament 
and the Provincial councils have limited authority and budget influence. The Parliament has, 
however, attempted to impose more control over President Karzai during the last year, especially on 
appointments to key government positions. The composition of the new Parliament to be elected in 
autumn 2010 will influence the direction and willingness to intervene. The local Governors have 
likewise limited influence on provincial development budgets, with these primarily handled by the 
provincial offices of the line ministries. There is increased international and Afghan concern about 
the ability of the Afghan government to take charge of development and improve governance 
institutions. Concerns about corruption are frequently mentioned as a factor that reduces support for 
the Afghan government, though a welcome development in this regard is that the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has accepted Afghanistan as a candidate country. 
 
The peace that has benefitted developments in northern Afghanistan since 2001 is fragile. Relations 
within and towards Kabul form part of a constantly negotiated balance where what appear to be 
minor changes might alter the entire power balance in the north. The main contenders for power are 
two former warlords. One is General Ahmed Rashid Dostum who heads the primarily Uzbek party 
Junbesh-i Milli and who was recently reinstated by President Karzai as Chief of Staff of the Afghan 
Army. Opposing him is Governor of Balqh province Atta Mohammad Noor who holds a central 
role in the primarily Tajik party Jamiate-e Islami. Another potential source of conflict relates to 
ethnicity, particularly the longstanding conflict between the largest ethnic group the Pashtuns and 
minorities such as the Turkmens, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks and the Hazaras. Within the region, Dostum 
has oriented himself towards Uzbekistan and Turkey, while Atta draws on relations with Russia and 
Iran and more recently the US. Both of them regard Pakistan as a major enemy due to their support 
for the predominantly Pashtun Taliban.   
 
The review has identified a range of risks and challenges to the further process that Norad and 
Norway is advised to reflect on in their further planning.  
 
The security situation is stable in northern Afghanistan, but there is an increased risk for instability 
if the internal political balance is changed or/and the relationship between local power-holders and 
the GoA is altered. The potential withdrawal of US and international forces from Afghanistan from 
2011 onwards might increase security unpredictability.   
 
There is notable risk emerging from the high degree of mistrust that exists between the central and 
local governance levels, not least relating to the utilization of natural resources and 
securing/distributing income from these. Suspicions of corruption and fear that information might 
be withheld for purposes of personal gain are widespread.   
 
A distrust of intentions is not only limited to other Afghan actors: most Afghans express a high 
level of suspicion about the motives and intentions of neighbouring countries and, increasingly, also 
of the international community.  
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The lack of an updated Afghan Energy Masterplan constitutes a high risk in that the 
internal/external coordination of projects and efforts might be driven by the interests of single 
actors, Afghan and international, rather than towards a clearly defined common goal. The urgency 
for progress in this sector might come to override sound longer term planning. 
 
That stated, Afghans are of the opinion that oil and gas reserves are national property, to be used for 
the benefit of all Afghans and not groups in particular areas or individuals holding key positions. 
What remains a concern is that many Afghans point out the risk of a lack of political willingness to 
ensure that such benefits will have a fair distribution and that a framework will come in place to 
monitor the process and income distribution. Afghan women are particularly concerned that they 
risk being kept outside processes and decisions that will influence their ability to make use of the 
potential hydrocarbon resources have for job creation, education and the household environment. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Afghan oil and gas industry has existed and been in production since the 
mid 1980s. The risk is that knowledge and skills do not necessary match the upcoming requirements 
for further developments within the sector. 
 
Balancing the notable achievements that have come into place through Norwegian facilitation and 
support for the Government of Afghanistan with the range of risks identified, Norad is advised to 
consider the following: 
  
Await further engagement on policy matters relating to implementation of the Hydrocarbons Law 
and a new (if materializing) Hydrocarbon bidding round until there is further clarity as to how the 
Government of Afghanistan aims to develop and utilize these resources and to what extent major 
external donors support such policies. 
 
Consider to provide, upon request from the GoA, the following assistance that at the moment entails 
fewer risks while also addressing major challenges and needs in the wider energy sector:  
 
 Advice on the political/diplomatic process of negotiating agreements for utilization and 
division of underground natural resources (and water) with neighbouring countries.  
 Assist in training and development of Afghan technical expertise in oil and gas exploration, 
production and management, aiming at ensuring that both the Technical Faculty in Jowzjan 
and Afghan Gas Company has the required skills and capacity to meet present and future 
needs in this sector. 
 Assist in the further development of the hydro power and alternative energy sector, where 
smaller investments throughout Afghanistan might be of larger benefits and smaller risks 
(including on security) than the involvements in the oil and gas sector might include. 
 Be active in providing information about past and present Norwegian involvement in the 
energy sector, including in local languages and in multiple media channels. 
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Introduction 
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) has through Oil for 
Development been engaged in capacity building and provision of technical support to the 
Afghan Ministry of Mines (MoM) since 2007. A part of this engagement relates to the 
commercialization of gas and oil reserves in the Sheberghan area of the northern Jowzjan 
province through an international bidding process. This follows Norwegian support for the 
development of the Afghan Hydrocarbons Law, that entered into force on 1 February 2009.   
 
Norad, through its Energy department (ENA), holds responsibility for continuous follow-up 
of the collaboration, in dialogue with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as 
the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul. The activities are implemented by Econ Pöyry (project 
management and technical issues), Arntzen de Besche (legal issues) and Gaffney Cline 
Associates (commercial utilization). Capacity development is headed by PETRAD. A 
timeline presenting the various engagements with the Afghan Ministry of Mines (MoM) is 
presented in Annex III. 
 
Norad’s position is that utilization of Afghan petroleum reserves will have considerable 
spinoff effects locally, nationally and regionally. A local conversion of gas into electricity 
plus supply of electricity to Kabul is one of the alternatives considered. Estimates of available 
gas resources indicate a potential generation of 1000 megawatt (MW) over 25 years, or 500 
MW over 50 years. This could make possible extensive electrification in northern 
Afghanistan, and allow electric supply to the mining industry in Aynak (copper, Logal 
Province) and Hajigak (iron ore, Bamyan Province). A 100 – 150 MW gas plant, to be based 
in Shegerghan in Jowzjan province, is under consideration by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), while the Asia Development Bank (ADB) is 
considering an upgrading of the gas fields. The development of the Aynak copper mine, 
contracted to the Chinese company China Metallurgical Group Corp (MCC), includes a coal 
fired power plant.   
 
Gas export is another possibility considered, possibly in combination with other alternatives. 
The chosen solution will, among a range of concerns, depend on the size of the gas reserves 
and production capacity. The development of this sector will involve both central and regional 
actors within Afghanistan.  
The scope of the study 
The Terms of Reference (ToR) for this study, available in Annex I, outline that developments 
in north Afghanistan and relations between the northern areas and the central administration 
should be an important element of this study. In addition to the roles of General Dostum, 
Governor Atta and President Karzai, the study should include an analysis of relations between 
Uzbek and other ethnic based political and military organizations such as Junbesh-i Milli and 
the Northern Alliance, as well as the Afghan Central Government.  
 
More generally the ToR request a better and more comprehensive assessment of actors and 
development scenarios in light of the conflicting interests between the central government and 
regional actors. It is desirable to set Sherbergan in a national energy perspective, and clarify 
the division of roles between different actors within energy development in Afghanistan. The 
need for strengthened coordination is considered important. 
 
The study shall moreover address income division between regional (district and province) 
and central authorities, including what influence provincial councils and the parliament hold 
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on decisions of income distribution. It should also address plans that exist in the Independent 
Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) in this regard, and clarify IDLGs opinion on income 
division.  
 
Other issues to be addressed include: 
 
 Views of local authorities on oil and gas extraction, possibly including what 
initiatives might be important to attract local interest.  Local authorities to be 
consulted should include both elected and appointed representatives, and provincial 
representation of some ministries. 
 
 An assessment of potential initiatives that can be implemented to secure a larger 
focus on the gender dimension, including women rights and involvement.  
 
 The security situation in northern Afghanistan, and potential consequences for 
development of an oil and gas based industry particularly in Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pol. 
 
 Relevant regional factors of importance for the assessment of possibilities and the 
conflict potentials, as the initiatives for energy transmission through Afghanistan 
from Central to South Asia through Afghanistan. 
 
 Potential for regional utilization of electricity production based on the gas deposits 
and a mapping of relevant challenges in this connection.  
 
Methodology 
This report is based on three primary sources of information. One is the literature review 
undertaken by Aled Williams on issues relating to governance and income division of natural 
resources and potential for corruption in such management. The second is information on the 
security situation in Afghanistan in general and north Afghanistan in particular, and the 
process that is underway for exploring and utilizing Afghan and regional oil and gas 
resources. This information was drawn from a range of written sources, but complemented by 
interviews of international and Afghan actors in Kabul and north Afghanistan conducted by 
Eng. Mohammed Hakim, Sidiqa Newrozi, Akbar Sarwari and Arne Strand. The third source 
was a series of semi structured interviews with a wide range of informant (see annex II) 
conducted by the team in Kabul, Maymane, Saripul and Mazar-e Sharif, plus follow-up 
interviews through phone and email communication conducted by Arne Strand. 
 
In an acknowledgement of the sensitivity of the issues and the recognition of very limited 
knowledge in northern Afghanistan about the Afghan government’s plans for exploration of 
oil and gas resources, the ongoing bidding process and the Norwegian support provided the 
team to adapt a conflict sensitive research approach.  When undertaking interviews in north 
Afghanistan the Afghan team-members started the interviews by informing (using a set text 
based on the ToR) about the background and extent of the Norwegian support to the Ministry 
of Mines, including for development of the Hydrocarbons Law and the bidding process.  
Thereafter, the aims of the research and the independence of the research team from both 
NORAD and the Government of Afghanistan was explained. Thereby the team ensured that 
information about the Norwegian involvement and the absence of Norwegian commercial 
actors in the ongoing bidding process was known to governors and members of PCs in the 
Faryab, Jowzjan and Balqh provinces. This was done to counter the lack of information noted 
in the provinces, frequently cited distrust in the Karzai government and expressed suspicion 
that foreign actors intend to exploit Afghan national resources to their own advantage. 
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Literature review: Natural resources, conflict and 
corruption 
A review of literature relating to the use, risks and opportunities of natural resources in 
conflict or post conflict contexts, and the potential for development of corrupt practices is 
presented below. 
1.1 Structuring the management of natural resource revenues 
after conflict 
Re-opening or developing new natural resource industries in post-conflict settings presents a 
double set of challenges when it comes to structuring the management of resource revenues. 
Governance of revenues should be structured in such a way that a return to violence is 
avoided and peaceful relations promoted. But revenue management arrangements should also 
mitigate the negative effects of the resource curse1, including the pursuit of socially costly 
activities like corruption. Given the potential for natural resources to affect corruption, for 
natural resources to affect conflict motivation, type and duration, and for corruption to affect 
conflict, there are no straightforward responses to these two main challenges. Some policy 
considerations may be drawn, however, from case-studies of re-opened and newly developed 
extractive industries in post-conflict settings, and from more general country experiences in 
sharing revenues from natural resources.  
 
Boege and Franks (2009) note that re-opening or developing new mining projects in post-
conflict settings may contribute simultaneously to peacebuilding and to an increase in social 
tensions. The revenues, jobs and infrastructure accompanying such projects are double-edged, 
providing hope for the future but also stirring historical resentments or causing new problems 
(such as corruption or violence). Using case-studies from Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) 
and Guatemala, they argue that the hybrid political orders present in post-conflict settings, 
where non-state traditional actors and institutions function alongside the state, mean that 
constructing a “social license” for governing resources is at least as important as establishing 
formal structures and institutions. Deriving mutual benefits from resource rents will not 
always be possible and the challenges may be compounded by problems associated with 
determining whose consent is required for a particular resource to be accessed. There are 
distinctions too to be made between new extractive resource projects untainted by violent 
conflict, and re-opened projects that may be burdened by a connection to war. From their 
perspective, the prospects for a project’s success may primarily be enhanced via improved 
community relations practices. These include informal and formal opportunities for 
consultation, engagement and participation (such as community reference panels and boards, 
and community monitoring programmes), activities that foster community understanding 
(such as stakeholder analysis and cultural mapping), and processes for responding to 
complaints and disputes (such as dispute resolution and grievance handling mechanisms). 
 
Decentralisation of control over natural resource revenues has been widely promoted as a 
means to enhance welfare benefits and promote equity in their use. Theoretically, 
decentralisation of the management of resource revenues could have positive effects both for 
peacebuilding and for mitigating corruption, since they aim to increase the scope for popular 
participation in decisions surrounding the benefits derived from natural resource endowments. 
Ribot (2003) argues, however, that decentralisation of natural resources in Africa – which saw 
a large number of resource-related decentralisation reforms in the 1990’s - has largely not 
succeeded in establishing conditions for more efficient or equitable use or management of 
resources, including resource revenues. The argument here is that decentralisation requires a 
                                                     
1 See section 1.4. 
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combination of locally accountable representation and discretionary power transfers in order 
to be successful. Ribot notes this combination is rarely achieved in Africa, with alternative 
local institutions chosen even when democratic local bodies exist. In circumstances where 
systematic means for public participation in local decisions are limited, it is likely that 
transfers of power over resource revenues to the local arena will result in deconcentration 
rather than more accountable decentralisation. It may be envisaged that decentralisation 
reforms for resource revenues in post-conflict settings can become a new battleground with 
potential negative effects both on the prevalence of corruption and on social violence.    
 
An innovative alternative approach to managing oil and gas revenues has been suggested by 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) with reference to Nigeria. Their approach entails 
establishing a system (distinct from an oil revenue fund) whereby resource revenues are 
transferred directly to citizens rather than managed by public officials (either at local or 
central level). The approach implies that resource revenues would not directly enter state 
budgets, but would rather be collected via taxation. It is argued that this would simultaneously 
shield the economy from volatile injections of oil and gas revenues, reduce incentives and 
opportunities for public officials to engage in rent-seeking and patronage related to these 
revenues, and create positive incentives for improved governance and taxation capacities. It is 
acknowledged that significant practical difficulties in implementing such a system would 
need to be overcome and that corruption and mismanagement could also plague the new 
approach. However, by treating capital generated through the production of oil and gas in the 
same way as other forms of capital, an avenue to deflate likely suspicions and tension arising 
from more conventional revenue sharing arrangements may perhaps be opened up, creating 
space for discussion of improved methods of taxation which may have wider benefits beyond 
the natural resource sector.   
1.2. How might external interventions positively influence 
existing post-conflict governance arrangements? 
Scharbatke-Church and Reiling (2009) note that when local populations perceive external 
interventions as ethically compromised, for instance where internationally brokered 
agreements appear to overtly favour a particular group, there is a risk to the overall legitimacy 
of external engagement. Both the actual and perceived manner in which outside forces 
interact with existing institutions and respond to on-the-ground governance arrangements are 
of concern therefore. Working with the grain of existing local patterns of governance implies 
reaching an acute understanding of the actors, nature and dynamics of these existing patterns. 
Much recent anti-corruption literature stresses that understanding the formal institutions and 
roles of key actors is insufficient for determining the political economy of localised power 
relations. Real effort should also be made to appreciate the de facto framework and informal 
means by which decisions are reached and enforced. This implies continual engagement with 
advanced political economy assessment methodologies and power or stakeholder analyses so 
that changes to power relations over time and local responses to particular events or 
interventions may be appreciated. This is in keeping with the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) principles for good international engagement in 
fragile state settings, which stress that sound political analysis should be used by international 
actors to mix and sequence support according to specific contextual factors (OECD: 2007). 
 
Intense effort is also required to understand the system of incentives that underpins corruption 
at a local level. The overtly negative connotations that corrupt activity holds for many 
external observers can undermine a clear appreciation of the welfare implications of informal 
relations. Patronage networks, in particular, are rational survival techniques in post-conflict 
settings (Uvin: 2009). Disrupting these relations by, for instance, pursuing punitive anti-
corruption measures can present a direct threat to livelihoods, which may in turn give rise to 
further conflicts. Local resentment towards such approaches are likely to be reinforced if they 
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result in a targeting of rank-and-file members of the population, but leave the elite ‘big fish’ 
unaffected.2 
 
Participation and empowerment of local populations are repeatedly cited in the literature as 
central both to successful anti-corruption interventions and to peace-building efforts, and may 
serve to enhance the positive aspects of existing local governance arrangements. But what 
does “real” participation look like, and what might local empowerment imply in practice? 
Among the many possible answers to these questions, ensuring sound information provision 
to local communities about external assistance decisions and projects appears to be an 
important element. Some external actors may, however, fail to connect information delivery 
to actual processing by local individuals. NATO’s International Security and Assistance Force 
(ISAF) database of reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan, for instance, 
provides details of more than 70,000 separate activities including road and school building. It 
is, however, provided in English and may be viewed only via a restricted access website 
(Galtung and Tisné: 2009).3 This is in contrast to the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) supported Development Assistance Database for Afghanistan which 
provides public information in Dari on funds committed and disbursed by government 
agencies, NGOs and international donors.4 
1.3 Should local solutions be prioritised over outside remedies? 
Reinforcing locally driven governance processes is noted in much recent anti-corruption 
literature as essential to the legitimacy of measures intended to counter corrupt activity. 
Gaining trust and “buy-in” from local populations in post-conflict governance arrangements is 
also considered a key element in preventing a slide back to war. There are risks, however, in 
over-inflating the moral primacy of local solutions. Uvin (2009) argues that post-
independence Burundi experienced disruption to its largely accepted patronage system 
through the emergence of national and local leaders unconnected to traditional claims to 
power. Coupled with severe economic decline from the mid-1980s, Uvin argues this 
disruption contributed in large part to the country’s civil war from 1993 to 2005. Where the 
perversion of local governance arrangements is a contributing factor in conflict, there would 
seem little reason to uphold these arrangements over other solutions. Indeed, the decent to 
conflict may be taken as an indication that a shift in power arrangements was required at a 
fundamental level. 
 
Negotiations intended to end hostilities may also involve agreements that are not conducive to 
long term peace (Adwan: 2005). From this perspective, deals struck with local power brokers 
prior to the cessation of hostilities should be viewed as transitional and subject to revisiting 
once a process of stabilisation begins. Kibranian (2009) argues that the 1989 Taef Agreement 
in Lebanon, though reached through consensus among all local factions, enshrined power-
sharing as an end in itself, with warlords, elites and wealthy businessmen dividing power 
among each other but leaving little room for representation of non-traditional interest groups. 
The promotion by outside actors of concepts and mechanisms of good governance, 
accountability, transparency and the rule of law, can perhaps offer welcome relief where post-
conflict governance becomes mired in corruption. Dininio (2009) argues that the introduction 
of stringent international oversight mechanisms, as done under the Governance and Economic 
Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) in Liberia, succeeded in stemming large scale 
looting of state resources.5 The programme, which asserted intrusive oversight over revenue 
collection, consolidated all deposits in a single account at the central bank and required co-
signature from internationally recruited staff placed in key ministries.     
                                                     
2 For an interesting discussion of varying notions of legitimacy in post-conflict settings see OECD: 2010. 
3 See: www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2008/02-february/pr080210-065.html 
4 See: dadafghanistan.gov.af/rc?sessionid=1273234462596621. 
5 See: www.gemapliberia.org 
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1.4 How does the availability of natural resources affect 
corruption?  
Countries dependent on revenue from natural resource exports tend to experience low or 
negative growth, low levels of development, and high levels of inequality and poverty.6 
Corruption is often considered to be both a by-product of and a contributing factor to this 
resource curse. The presence of resource endowments may result in a high level of rent-
seeking behaviour, while corruption may occur within systems of resource management 
themselves, reinforcing their suboptimal use and degrading their possible effects on welfare 
(Kolstad and Søreide: 2009). Whatever the causality involved Gylafson (2008) shows that 
corruption is generally more pervasive in mineral-rich countries than in upper middle-income 
countries.7  
 
A distinction is sometimes made between negative resource effects on economies where 
resources are abundant and in economies that are dependent upon them. To the extent that 
resource dependence involves public allocation of access to scarce common-property 
resources to private parties, it should be expected that some resource-rich countries may be 
more susceptible to corruption than others (Gylafson: 2008). Likewise, the presence of 
corruption may vary according to natural resource type. It is argued that Sierra Leone’s 
alluvial diamonds, for instance, are more readily lootable than Botswana’s kimberlite 
diamonds, which are located deeper underground and require considerable investments to 
recover to the surface (Gylafson: 2008).     
 
When explaining the possible negative effects of resource rents (including corruption) 
emphasis is commonly placed on rent-seeking and on patronage.8 Rent-seeking explanations 
focus on institutional quality as a key factor: put simply, countries with bad institutions will 
suffer a resource curse, while those with good institutions will not. Some rent-seeking models 
also suggest that the effect of resources may depend on variables such as the initial level of 
rent-seeking and ethnic fractionalisation (Kolstad and Søreide 2009). Patronage perspectives, 
on the other hand, place greater emphasis on the opportunities and incentives that resource 
rents provide political leaders to pay off supporters to stay in power. A politician may, for 
example, choose to spend resource rents on providing public sector employment to his or her 
supporters in order to increase the probability of their political support. From this point of 
view, the institutions that require critical support are those that govern the allocation of public 
resources, and thereby hold politicians to account for their use of resource-derived public 
funds (Kolstad and Søreide 2009). 
1.5 Particular effects of natural resources on corruption in post-
conflict settings 
The links between natural resources and conflict have been explored extensively. Two 
recurring themes from the literature are (i) that armed conflicts are motivated by control of 
natural resources, and (ii) that natural resources may be integrated into the financing of 
conflict. Ross (2004) provides a useful investigation of these and related hypotheses from 14 
cross-national studies focusing on natural resources and civil war, noting some important 
variations in terms of the type of resource at stake and their conflict effects.9 This echoes, to 
                                                     
6 For overviews of the extensive literature on the resource curse, see: Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007); 
Collier and Goderis (2007); Rosser (2006); Kolstad and Søreide (2009). 
7 This is based on Gylafson’s computations using data gathered from the World Bank, UNESCO, Transparency 
International, and the University of Maryland.  
8 See, for example: Robinson et al (2006), Mehlum et al 2006, and Robbins (2000). 
9 Ross (2004) finds four main trends: i) oil dependence appears linked to the initiation of conflicts, but not their 
duration, ii) gemstones, opium, cocoa and cannabis do not seem linked to conflict initiation, but do seem to 
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some extent, Le Billon’s (2001) analysis of the relation between the nature and geography of 
a resource and types of conflict, which underlines that the physical availability and spatial 
distribution of resources are crucial with regard to the opportunities for looting presented to 
belligerent actors. Lujala (2010) finds that the location of resources is crucial to conflict 
duration, with oil and gas reserves effecting duration regardless of whether production has 
already begun. It is of note, however, that Le Billon (2001) also stresses the role played by 
human desires, needs and practices in whether a resource in its natural state will be 
appropriated, for purposes peaceful or otherwise.  
 
Less well-examined are the particular effects of natural resources on corruption in post-
conflict settings, though several studies have attempted to link the resource-conflict debate to 
other elements of the resource curse discussion, including corruption.10 What appears 
relatively uncontested is that the shift between war and peace may, in itself, present rich 
opportunities for corruption since new economic activities are likely to emerge in a context of 
continued violence and weak governance (Le Billon: 2003). Where natural resources have 
been an important element in the political economy of war, the incentives and opportunities 
for engaging in corrupt activity in order to secure benefits from resource rents are likely to be 
quite significant. Precisely how significant could depend on a wide range of factors, but 
among them are likely to be the fragility of post-conflict governance arrangements and the 
nature of the resources in question. Le Billon (2003) notes that, even when committed to 
peace agreements, leaders may not be able to secure enforcement among followers if these 
individuals are more strongly influenced by personal economic gains. This implies that the 
lootability of resources in terms of their geographic location and distribution could be 
important on two counts: resource lootability may influence the type and duration of conflict, 
but it may also influence the opportunities for engaging in resource-related rent-seeking 
behaviour during peacetime. Along this line of argument, the presence of resources that do 
not require significant investment for their appropriation are more likely to present obstacles 
to lasting peace, just as they create incentives for the prolongation of war. It should be noted, 
however, that this argument does not account for Lujala’s (2010) finding that the location of 
oil and gas reserves influence conflict duration regardless of whether production has already 
begun.   
 
Natural resources may present opportunities and incentives to engage in corruption, and 
resources may be linked to conflict type, motivation and duration. But corruption and conflict 
may also be directly linked. Rose-Ackerman (2008) suggests that, in the absence of what 
might be termed “good governance”, corruption may be a short-term mechanism for retaining 
a semblance of social organisation that may prevent violent disintegration. This echoes Le 
Billon’s (2003) earlier hypothesis that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the 
pattern of corruption than by its existence per se. In policy terms, this implies that extreme 
caution is required when providing international assistance to avoid exacerbating underlying 
governance challenges. Where the presence or prospect of natural resource rents has played 
an important role in a conflict’s political economy, arrangements for the management of 
natural resource endowments should be given special attention. Two central issues here are (i) 
to what extent can interventions on the part of external actors improve on existing governance 
arrangements to promote greater stability and levels of welfare; and (ii) how might this be 
done in a manner that does not disrupt governance arrangements to an extent that a return to 
violence becomes an attractive option. 
                                                                                                                                                        
lengthen pre-existing wars, iii) there is no statistical evidence linking agricultural commodities to either initiation 
or duration of conflict, iv) primary commodities do not appear associated with the onset of civil war.   
10 See, for instance: Marshall (2001); Sachs and Warner (1999); Schloss (2002). 
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Afghan hydrocarbon reserves 
Afghan hydrocarbon resources are primarily located in northern Afghanistan, but there is still 
uncertainty as to how large these resources are. The first oil field was located in 1959 and the 
Soviet Union undertook a geological survey and made extensive use of oil and gas resources 
during the period of their military invasion from 1979 to 1989. They identified then more than 
150 million barrels of oil (mmbo) reserves and more than 4,500 billion cubic feet of gas 
(bcfg) reserves in 29 fields in the Afghan portion of the Amu Darya and Afghan-Tajik basins. 
In addition to extensive exportation via pipelines to the Soviet Union, gas was distributed 
locally and transferred via a pipeline to a fertilizer factory in Mazar-e- Sharif. The extent and 
income of these exports was not made public, but Afghans are of the view that the income 
provided a sizable part of their development budget transferred from the USSR at that time.  
 
The resources were managed by the Afghan Gas Company, and a technical college in 
Sherbergan was established to educate and train technicians and staff for the oil and gas 
industry. The college still provides education in this field (see below box) and the Afghan Gas 
Company maintains a staff of almost 2300. The Minister of Mines emphasized in our 
discussion a need to reform the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-border exports were terminated following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, but gas 
continued to be used locally. When the then Uzbek militia leader Abdul Rashid Dostum 
captured the largest northern city of Mazar-e Sharif in the neighbouring Balqh province, he 
started to provide the city with piped gas from resources at the Sherbergan plant. Dostum 
moreover controlled an oil refinery in Sar-e-Pul built during the 1990s (still effectively under 
his control), which might be important if and when oil production can be restarted. Gas is also 
still provided to the fertilizer factory in Mazar-e Sharif, where there is a recognised potential 
to increase the production of urea if further investments can be made and gas continue to be 
supplied.   
 
After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 initiatives were taken to obtain a better assessment of 
the existing oil and gas resources. Funded by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) 
a nationwide oil and gas resources assessment, using a geology-based assessment 
methodology, was initiated by the United States Geological Survey in spring 2003. The 
estimates for northern Afghanistan were released in 2006, and were of 1,596 million barrels 
of crude oil, 15,687 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 562 million barrels of natural gas 
liquids. There are currently new studies underway to obtain a more precise overview of these 
resources. However, most of the undiscovered crude oil is expected to be located in the 
Afghan-Tajik Basin, while most of the undiscovered natural gas is in the Amu Darya Basin 
where the present exploration is taking place. These resources are to a certain extent shared 
with Afghanistan’s northern neighbours Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, who are 
either making extensive use of and exporting their own resources, or plan to do so. There is 
Jowzjan Technical College 
 
The Engineering Faculty has presently three departments: mines and geology, 
technology, and construction. There are 2000 students, of which 600 are girls (more 
would apply if dormitories were available), and seven female lecturers. 
 
The Technical Gas and Oil High school has 240 students (boys and girls) and nine female 
teachers. The main subjects taught are: car mechanics, electricity and drilling of oil and 
gas wells, and high voltage electricity. 
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presently no agreement between Afghanistan and its neighbours on the utilization of natural 
resources as oil and gas. 
 
The first Hydrocarbons Bidding Round, assisted by Norway, was for three blocks; 
Jangalikalan Block: Jangalikalan (gas), Juma-Bashikurd Block: Juma (gas), Bashikurd (gas), 
Kashkari Block: Kashkari (oil), Angoat (oil), Aqdarya (oil). The Ministry of Mines notes that 
only two of these fields have been in production. Angoat was in sustained production, while 
Kashkari produced only modest amounts of oil for 6 months in the late 1980s. With reference 
to US based consultancy firm Gustavson, the ministry provide the following estimates for the 
size of the blocks and the remaining recoverable reserves, though assuming that the reserves 
will be larger: Jangalikalan Block (1,999 km2): 19 Bm3, Juma-Bashikurd Block (1,861 km2): 
33 Bm3, Kashkari Block (1,723 km2): 64.4 MM Bbl (plus 143.8 MM Bbl of possible 
reserves).11 
 
Following the preparation of the Afghanistan Power Sector Master Plan by Norconsult in 
October 2004, USAID initiated a feasibility study of a Sherbergan-based gas powered plant. 
Then, in April 2009, USAID funded the instalment of a drilling rig to test existing gas levels 
to determine if the wells contained enough gas to fuel such a power plant.12 The Turkish 
company contracted for the testing did not, however, complete that task following a series of 
delays that, according to USAID, led them to terminate the contract. The Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction  provides a more nuanced pictured on this 
termination (see below box), but does point out the potential importance of the project in 
securing Afghanistan’s demand for low cost power.13 The project risk referred to is expected 
to be an incident where General Dostum sent 200 armed men to protect the well. The team 
was not able to clarify why this incident took place, what the armed men intended to protect, 
why they then chose to withdraw, and following whose intervention. 
 
 
 
Map 1: Amu Darya and Afghan Tajik Basins 
Map available at: http://www.aapg.org/explorer/2006/07jul/afghanistan_map.jpg 
 
  
                                                     
11 For further information about these three fields and the hydrocarbon bidding process please see this dedicated 
webpage: http://www.afghanistanpetroleum.com/index.php  
12 For details see http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/fa/Article.606.aspx 
13 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2010) Afghanistan Energy Supply Has 
Increased but An Updated Master Plan is Needed and Delays and Sustainability Concerns Remain. January 15, 
2010. SIGAR AUDIT- 10-4 Energy Sector 
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Despite these challenges, USAID informed the interview team in mid-March 2010 that they 
remained committed to establish a 100 – 150 MW gas driven power plant, and confirmed that 
the Asia Development Bank (ADB) had agreed to upgrade the gas fields.14 A TOR is under 
development between ADB and the company Gustavson Associates for the testing of wells. 
USGS is about to undertake further and more precise studies on the size of available oil and 
gas resources, though it may take several years before the data can be made available. USAID 
had hired Advanced Energy Associates International to develop a road map for the use of 
energy in Sherbergan, and to work on the possibilities to market the natural resources there as 
a viable product.  
 
The recently elected Mayor of Kabul proposed in his election campaign to supply pipelined 
gas from northern Afghanistan for the Kabul population. His suggestion is to upgrade the 
existing pipeline from Jowzjan to Mazar-e Sharif, and then build a new pipeline along the 
highway to Kabul that could provide gas to the population close to the road and easily be 
guarded against attack. This was also mentioned by USAID, but they moreover noted plans 
for a new north–south highway through Bamyan in central Afghanistan that might be a future 
alternative pipeline route. 
 
The Mayor argued in our interview that energy transfers from the north to Kabul could allow 
for hydropower generated in plants close to Kabul and Jalalabad to be utilized in eastern and 
southeastern Afghanistan. It was his opinion that this could help reduce a potential conflict 
between a “developed” capital and an “underdeveloped” rural population south of Kabul, 
while the same benefit could be achieved for the population along the pipeline from the north 
to Kabul by allowing them to make use of the gas transferred.  
 
There are a number of other energy transfer projects planned in the wider region where 
Afghanistan could act as a hub. An electrical transmission line has already been constructed 
from Uzbekistan to Kabul which, according to some sources, has a dimension that will allow 
for transmission of the additional electricity that might be generated from a gas-powered plant 
in Sherbergan. There are moreover plans for building a new transmission line for electricity, 
termed CASA REM, based on high-voltage, direct current (HVDC) technology, from Central 
Asia through Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. This is a major investment involving the World 
Bank and there is uncertainty if the project will be implemented. In March 2010 the 
possibility of routing electricity from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Tajikistan was 
                                                     
14 An estimate made suggest that there are available gas resources in these fields for production of  
1000 MW.  
 
SIGAR Audit regarding Sherbergan Gas Fields 
 
The Sheberghan gas fields development project represents a particularly interesting 
case. At the point of the termination for convenience, the United States had spent $7.1 
million on the project. According to USAID, the termination for convenience was due to 
subcontractor nonperformance. However, Louis Berger /Black & Veatch Joint Venture 
officials stated that the termination was at the convenience of the U.S. Government 
and that there were project delays caused by Afghan customs issues, security issues, 
and the need to negotiate assumption of certain project risks by the Afghan 
government. This cancellation has significant implications for Afghanistan’s future 
energy independence since natural gas represents an indigenous energy resource 
which experts estimate could, in theory, meet the country’s demand for low cost power 
for decades to come if properly developed. USAID officials stated that they felt the 
funds would be better spent by setting up a public-private partnership to build a power 
plant (page 10). 
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brought to the attention of the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy (ICE), and the project 
is in an early phase of exploration. 
 
The Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAPI), previously referred to as the Peace-pipeline, aimed 
to bring natural gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and eventually India, and has been under 
discussion since the mid 1990s. Companies such as Unocal and Bridas made then their 
interest known and engaged with the Taliban and Pakistan to secure an agreement for the 
pipeline to cross west Afghanistan (Rashid: 2000). But increased concern over Taliban 
policies and the later UN sanctions on the regime put the development on hold. Plans were 
renewed in May 2002 after the fall of the Taliban, and the ADB commissioned a feasibility 
study that was presented in 2005.15 The Afghan Minister of Mines informed the team that he 
had recently taken a new initiative to revive these plans, seeing the income potential for 
Afghanistan from such a project. 
 
However, given insecurity in Afghanistan and pressing energy needs in Pakistan and India, 
these countries also pursued similar energy negotiations with Iran, the Iran-Pakistan-India 
Pipeline (IPI). The project has been strongly opposed by the United States due to their 
concerns over developments in Iran, and India withdrew their participation in 2009 following 
an agreement reached with the US on the development of their nuclear energy sector. 
Pakistan, on their part, continued the project and a project agreement were signed with Iran in 
March 2010.16 China, on their side, has with Turkmenistan established the Central Asia–
China gas pipeline, ending up in Xinjiang after having passed through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. This could, in the future, be a potential channel for export of Afghan gas if a 
connecting line is built from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan.   
 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has announced an intention to develop 
regional energy projects. But according to sources in the Afghan Foreign Ministry there have 
so far been few initiatives taken of benefit to Afghanistan. 
 
The above illustrates the wider political concerns in relation to energy development, 
transmission and utilization in the region, where Afghanistan is situated within a set of 
regional and international positions and ongoing negotiations. This might influence 
Afghanistan’s ability to generate revenue from energy transmission from Central to South 
Asia, at least in the short term. Development of existing Afghan resources, if primarily for use 
within Afghanistan at this stage, is not likely to pose the same political controversy and 
thereby risks that other countries may to try to intervene or influence decision making. 
Afghan governance structure and challenges 
The northern Jowzjan province is where oil and gas extraction has taken place so far. 
Presently a limited amount of gas is transported through a pipeline to the town of Mazar-e 
Sharif, located to the east in the Balqh province. In all provinces there are Governors 
appointed by either President Karzai or the Independent Directorate for Local Governance 
(IDLG) that was established in 2007 to improve local governance. The Governors’ influence 
seems to depend on their ability to draw on networks in the province and the region, their 
contact with and political and financial support provided by the President and/or the IDLG 
and their support from international donors and the military. The Governors hold only limited 
influence over funding channelled to each province, but are key actors in the development of 
the Provincial Development Plan (PDP). The present Jowzjan governor is connected to the 
political party Junbesh-i-e Milli, but is originally from the Faryab province. The Faryab 
                                                     
15 Details of the projects are presented in this ADB document: 
 http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/tar_oth_37018.pdf  
16 See http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62G12C20100317?sp=true 
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governor is from the ethnic and religious hazara minority, without any formal links to the 
province or other northern provinces. In contrast, the governor of Balqh is a former warlord 
from the Jamiate-e Islami party that hold extensive political and military influence in northern 
Afghanistan. His support for the opposition candidate to President Karzai in the 2009 
presidential elections set him up against the Kabul government and negotiations are ongoing 
on (the conditions for) his continued governorship.  
 
The elected Provincial Councils (PC) have likewise limited influence on governance and on 
development planning and implementation in the provinces, beyond being consulted and 
tasked to maintain a check and balance on the other governmental actors. The recent elections 
for the PCs involved major changes to PC members in the Faryab, Jowzjan and Balqh 
provinces, only 3 or 4 members were reported re-elected though the political parties seems to 
have maintained their influence. The PC relates to the elected Parliament in Kabul only to a 
very limited degree, and are administrated through the IDLG, as are the Governors.  
 
The bulk of development funding for each province is channelled through representations of 
line ministries in each province, as i.e. the Departments of Health, Education, Agriculture and 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development. These departments are involved in development of the 
PDP, but prefer to relate to their Ministry in Kabul than to governmental and elected actors in 
the province. 
 
The present governance system does not function very well, and tensions remain between the 
different actors and between Kabul and the provinces over influence, access to funding and to 
the degree of information and consultation over issues relating to the provinces. Informal 
networks, party and personal affiliations remain an important element in obtaining and 
maintaining positions and for ensuring influence.  
 
Another important aspect in this regard is a policy, developed by the then Minister of Finance 
Ashraf Ghani in 2002, to ensure that any income generated or collected through taxation 
(including from border trade) in the provinces is to be transferred to the Kabul government for 
redistribution.  This followed the appointment of a number of former military commanders to 
key positions as Governors, District Administrators and Chiefs of police to “coopt” them into 
the government structures to secure their loyalty. One goal of Minister Ghani’s policy was 
thus to ensure a degree of centralized control over income distribution, another was to counter 
the “cooptation strategy” by ensuring that warlords appointed as Governors would not be in a 
position to use local income opportunities to strengthen their own independence from the 
central authorities. Governor Ismael Khan in Herat was a case in point. The policy was not 
equally applied; the income from gem mining in northeast Afghanistan did not become 
subject to the regulation. 
 
There is, at present, increased international concern about the ability of the Afghan 
government to take charge of development and improve governance institutions. There is also 
concern about the notable lack of support for the government among broad segments of the 
Afghan population. A noted dilemma for the donor community is whether it should maintain 
a focus on development of the central government, and its ability to maintain a strong 
centralization of authority and power. Or should donors, rather, prioritise developments at 
province and district levels to ensure that capacity building and development activities can 
take place beyond Kabul. 
  
Concern about corruption is frequently mentioned as a factor that reduces support for the 
Afghan government among both international donors and the Afghan population. Recent 
statistics from ISAF’s Nationwide Survey indicate that 83 % of Afghans believe that 
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government corruption affects their daily lives, 29 % believe the president to be corrupt, 33 % 
the provincial governors and 34 % the district governors.17  
  
A welcome development in relation to the theme under study is that the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) has recently accepted Afghanistan as a candidate country. 
However, interviews indicate that more information is required in the various ministries about 
EITI, including what responsibilities rest on Afghanistan in the process towards implementing 
EITI requirements.18  
Northern Afghanistan 
The northern Afghan provinces are presently regarded as the most peaceful areas of 
Afghanistan. This has not always been the case and the area was the scene of intra ethnic 
fighting and massacres during the 1980s and 90s. A large number of the Pashtun population 
have been internally displaced in southern Afghanistan since 2002. There is an ongoing 
political and personal rivalry that includes networking towards the Kabul government, 
regional and international actors and states. Faryab is the Afghan province with the highest 
representation of the ethnic Uzbeks group, followed by the neighbouring province of Jowzjan 
and Sar-e Pol while Tajiks make up the majority in Balqh province. 
 
One major source of conflict relates to ethnicity, particularly the longstanding conflict 
between the largest ethnic group the Pashtuns that have held (with very short intervals) the 
position as kings and presidents in Afghanistan, and minorities such as the Turkmens, the 
Uzbeks (primarily living in the north), the Tajiks (strong influence in the north east, but with 
broad representation throughout northern Afghanistan) and the Hazaras (primarily in central 
Afghanistan, but strongly represented in cities such as Mazar-e Sharif). 
 
There has historically been a strained relationship between the Pashtuns and Afghan 
minorities such as the Uzbeks, the Tajiks and the Hazaras. From 1880 onwards Afghan Kings 
deported Pashtuns in opposition to their reign to northern Afghanistan in an effort to establish 
pockets of Pashtuns within the Uzbek, Turkmen and Tadjik minority groups. These, regarded 
by the minorities as unwanted settlers, were provided with land, as were Pashtun teachers that 
later moved to northern Afghanistan to ensure the teaching of Pashu  (in addition to Dari 
spoken in these areas) in the governmental schools. Pashtun nomads (koochies) that shifted 
their grazing routes into the north similarly made use of the local pastures. This led to 
continuous conflicts over land ownership and access to and use of water resources. The latent 
opposition against Pashtun exploitation in the north and national rule from Kabul intensified 
and turned violent as the minorities formed ethnic based military groups following the Soviet 
invasion. These either aligned themselves with the Kabul government (as General Dostum) or 
the armed opposition (the mujahedeen), later to join their forces in the Northern Alliance in 
the fight against the (primarily) Pashtun Taliban from 1994 onwards. 
 
The northern based Pashtuns gained influence during the Taliban period, though not everyone 
joined or supported the Taliban. Both the Taliban and the Uzbeks conducted massacres of war 
prisoners that increased the ethnic tension and demand for revenge. Pashtuns, as a group, 
were targeted for retaliation as the Northern Alliance came to power after joining forces with 
Operation Enduring Freedom in defeating the Taliban in late 2001. Pashtun farmers had then 
their land and herds confiscated, rape of both boys and girls were reported and many fled to 
stay in camps in Kandahar or Herat from 2002 onwards. One estimate is that as many as 
10 000 families left from Faryab alone. Efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner  
                                                     
17 For further details see US Congress (2010) Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 
April 2010,available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf 
18 See: http://eitransparency.org/Afghanistan 
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and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to help repatriate and 
restore property rights of the northern Pashtuns has only been a partial success and many still 
remain displaced in the south. The Pashtuns that have remained or returned to northern 
Afghanistan are in general suspected by the international military forces and the ethnic 
minorities of being potential supporters of the Taliban. 
 
But there have been a range of other internal conflicts over the last years that have contributed 
to an increase in ethnic tension in northern Afghanistan. Giustozzi describes the Faryab 
province as “the warlords’ hotbed” due to extreme levels of violence that took place in the 
1980s and 1990s and continued competition between militant leaders in northern Afghanistan, 
that gradually turned from an armed struggle to a political competition.19 
 
 
 
Poster outside the main entrance of the office of North Hydrocarbons in Sheberghan 
Photo: Geir Ytreland 
 
The two main contenders for power in the north are two former warlords. One is General 
Ahmed Rashid Dostum who heads the primarily Uzbek party Junbesh-i Milli and who was 
recently reinstated by President Karzai as Chief of Staff of the Afghan Army in a bid to 
ensure support for his re-election as president.20 Opposing him is Governor of Balqh province 
Atta Mohammad Noor who holds a central role in the primarily Tajik party Jamiate-e Islami 
that has expanded its influence throughout the north over the last years. An article by 
Mukhopadhyay from 2009 explains that “[H]e has embraced formal institution building to an 
extent but maintain[s] a degree of informal power that ensures his dominance in the region 
and his influence vis-a-vis Kabul.” 21Atta, as he is refereed to, however, fell out with 
President Karzai and key ministers as he supported the candidacy of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah 
                                                     
19 Antonio Giustozzi (2009) Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan. London, Hurst & Company. 
20 See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/world/asia/25karzai.html?_r=1 
21 Dipali Mukhopadhyay (2009) Disguised Warlordism and Combathood in Balkh: The Persistance of Informal 
Power in the Formal Afghan State, in Conflict, Security & Development, 9:4 December 2009, London. 
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as President, and is currently drawing on his “informal power” as he is negotiating to retain 
his position as governor.22  
 
The two of them started out as bitter enemies, Dostum heading an Uzbek milita force in 
support of the communist government – initially protecting the gas pipeline from Shegergan 
to the Soviet Union - while Atta was a mujahedeen commander fighting the communist 
government. Dostum’s switching of his alliances in 1992 brought down President Najibullah 
and led Kabul to fall to the mujahedeen, but he had a troubled relation to his partners in Kabul 
and to opposition against his rule within the north. Gradually expanding his power and 
establishing Mazar–e Sharif as the regional capital, he was eventually forced out by the 
Taliban (as his sub-commander Rasoul Parlawan shifted sides) in 1997 and took refuge in 
Turkey. 
 
Atta, growing in the Jamiat-e Islami ranks in the Balqh province was in constant competition 
with Dostum over influence and their two forces was close to engaging in battle to secure 
power in Mazar-e Sharif after the fall of Taliban in 2001. Negotiations led to a compromise 
over division of customs and other revenue, and acceptance by the parties of a more 
decentralized governance model helped settle the conflict. Balancing his alliances with the 
Jamiat-e Islami party and with President Karzai, Atta accepted to have his soldiers 
demobilised, and thereby secured himself the appointment as Governor of Balkh in 2004 – a 
position he has since retained. The economic development in the north has increased his 
political and financial support base, a position he used to expand the influence of (his branch) 
of Jamiat -e Islami throughout the north, including in areas dominated by General Dostum.23 
 
In a wider regional perspective, Dostum oriented himself towards and sought support from 
Uzbekistan and Turkey, while Atta initially drew on relations established with Russia and Iran 
and later the US. Both of them regard Pakistan as a major enemy to Afghanistan and to their 
position, and both are likely to resist a negotiated deal between the Government of 
Afghanistan and the Talban as that could reduce the gain achieved by the Afghan minorities 
in the state administration and leave them with less influence (and fewer positions) in the 
government. It is therefore of some concern that Turkey, with whom Dostum has remained in 
close contact, is about to establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Jowzjan. 
 
The peace that has benefitted developments in northern Afghanistan since 2001 is fragile. 
Relations within and towards Kabul form part of a constantly negotiated balance where what 
appear to be minor changes might alter the entire balance of power in the north, if the position 
or influence of General Dostum or Governor Atta is changed. That stated, there are 
organizational and political structures in place that might help mitigate differences and reduce 
the risk for such sudden escalations of violence as witnessed during the 1990s. Parties and 
individuals have benefitted from economic development in the region, and from having 
obtained political positions and influence in the parliament, in ministries and the broader state 
administration. Such factors are likely to add to the stabilization and willingness to reach 
compromise that won’t put economic and political capital at risk. However, no guarantees can 
be provided for a continued stable and conflict free north Afghanistan. 
Energy and environment 
A further dimension of the importance of increased utilization of Afghan hydro-carbon based 
energy resources relates to the environmental challenges Afghanistan is increasingly faced 
with. Droughts, logging and extensive use of firewood and dried manure for cooking and 
                                                     
22 A meeting held between President Karzai, Governor Atta and Elders from Balqh that was held in late April 2010 
did reportedly not solve these differences. 
23 It is reported that Jamiate-e Islami has recently opened an office in Maymane, Faryab province. 
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heating purposes in rural areas pose extensive challenges to the Afghan environment. Such 
activities, moreover, pose threats to the health of a majority of Afghan women who have 
responsibility for cooking and heating of water within their homes, often without proper 
ventilation. 
 
The below map indicates the environmental challenges in different parts of Afghanistan, 
including the drought that affects large parts of north and western Afghanistan. It was 
mentioned during interviews in Jowzjan that the lack of energy sources had forced farmers 
over the last winters to cut their fruit trees to have wood for heating. Despite the large energy 
resources in the province, the provincial capital only has electricity every second day. This 
has reduced the income potential of farmers and further increased environmental 
vulnerability. 
 
 
Map 2: Climate challenges in Afghanistan 
Source: DFID (2008) Socio-economic Impacts of Climate Change in Afghanistan. Executive 
Summary, London, Stockholm Environmental Institute, Oxford Office.   
 
 
The available data provide a clear indication on the imbalance between utilization and import 
of energy resources, with the use of biomass as the main Afghan energy resource.  
 
 
Illustration 1: Afghan Energy Production and Import (2007) 
Sources: Asia Development Bank and NEPA.  
 
 
This is not only of environmental concern, this 
development might increase the conflict potential in 
Afghanistan if not carefully handled. According to a 
study undertaken for Oxfam (2008) the major drivers of 
local conflicts relate to land, water and family issues. A 
scarcity of water leaves less land to be irrigated and 
available for agricultural production, with the potential 
for conflicts over both access to land and to water 
resources. Of regional concern is the lack of agreement 
between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the 
division and utilisation of the water from the river 
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constituting their border, the Amu Darya. The attention of the international military forces 
and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are primarily on military threats to the 
government and they have been reluctant to become involved in local conflicts such as those 
over water and land. There is, moreover, a likelihood of increased use of mechanical pumps in 
drought areas that might lower water tables and thus the potential outcome of the Afghan 
traditional underground irrigation systems, the karezes. 24 
 
A further utilization of Afghan oil and gas resources, if properly handled, could help reduce 
Afghanistan’s environmental challenge, potentially helping to reduce local conflict levels and 
certainly reduce dependence and the high cost of present energy purchases from neighbouring 
countries.  
Overall findings 
The interviews in Afghanistan brought about a set of general findings presented here to help 
understand the subsequent responses to the ToR questions. They relate to 1) information 
sharing and management; 2) income distribution; 3) assumptions on corruption and corrupt 
practices in tendering processes; 4) attitudes towards neighbouring countries and the 
international community; and 5) national utilization of  natural resources. 
 
1. Information sharing and management 
  
One of the most striking findings from the study was how limited but also how varied was the 
knowledge members of Parliament, the Provincial Governors, the Provincial Councils, non-
governmental organizations and members of the public had on the development and approval 
of the Hydrocarbons Law, the ongoing bidding process for oil and gas wells in Sherbergan, 
and the Norwegian role in providing technical and advisory support.  
 
Members of Parliament interviewed were aware of the Hydrocarbons Law, and they highly 
appreciated the support Norway had provided for the development of the law. They had, 
however, much less knowledge about the bidding procedures administrated by the Ministry of 
Mines, and several of them confused their influence and role in this process with the general 
provision made for parliamentary involvement in bidding processes outlined in the 
Procurement Law. 
 
The two Provincial Governors interviewed and members of the Provincial Councils claimed 
that they had not received any formal information about the Hydrocarbon Law, the ongoing 
bidding process or the Norwegian support. Some high ranking officials noted that they had 
received “unofficial” information about the bidding process, which is understood to have been 
conveyed to them through their personal and political affiliations in Kabul.  
 
The Norwegian involvement was only recognized by officials of the Ministry of Mines and 
Finance and employees of the Afghan Gas Company in Jowzjan that had visited Norway to 
learn about the Norwegian oil and gas industry. When this information was conveyed during 
the interview it brought about, with one exception discussed below, positive comments and a 
request for further Norwegian support for these processes. The Minister of Mines has the 
following request: “scale up the Norwegian engagement in northern Afghanistan, get 
involved in the exploration if the Afghan Tadjik Basin and help build the capacity of our 
departments.” 
 
                                                     
24 This concern is discussed in Bauck et.al. (2007) Afghanistan: An Assessment of Conflict and Actors in Faryab 
Province to Establish a Basis for Increased Norwegian Civilian Involvement. Bergen:  CMI Report R 2007: 1. 
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Several commented upon what they regarded as a lack of willingness of the Government and 
Ministries in Kabul to share information about developments likely to hold influence in their 
province. One comment from a head of a Provincial Council was: “The government does not 
seem to prioritize information to the elected councils or to the public. The process in the 
government is not clear to us, it seems that key actors just make their own decisions.”  Or as a 
Parliamentarian expressed it rather bitterly “they don’t inform us, they don’t want us to be 
informed.” 
 
It could here be noted that the dedicated webpage for “The First Afghan Hydrocarbons Law”, 
http://www.afghanistanpetroleum.com/index.php , is only available in English which limits its 
broader usefulness for Afghan businesses and local officials and elected council members 
with limited command of English. 
 
2. Assumptions on corruption and corrupt practices in tendering processes 
 
A frequently suggested reason for why such information was not forthcoming was that they 
expected officials in Kabul to deliberately withhold information, creating an opportunity for 
themselves to extract personal income from such resources. With frequent references to 
alleged corrupt practices in the bidding and allocation process for the Aynak copper mine, 
many referred to key government officials as “the Kabul mafia”.  
 
One parliamentarian summarized the Aynak process and the outcome with the following 
statement “Nobody really knows what happened in that case, and therefore nobody trusts 
anyone.”25 The same parliamentarian then drew a comparison with the Hydrocarbons bidding 
process, stating that “For a sustainable exploration of oil and gas we need a transparent 
government and press. We need to ensure that the laws that are approved (by the Parliament) 
are implemented, many are not at the moment.” 
 
While the corruption allegation has not been substantiated and no legal action has been taken 
against Minister Adel, there is a strong common belief (strengthened by recent international 
emphasis on the need to address corruption) that there is a very high degree of corruption 
among officials in the Afghan Government. That belief totally undermines the population’s 
trust in their authorities, as documented by concerns raised from members of the Parliament 
to the shopkeeper in the local bazaar. 
 
3. Income distribution 
 
The Government of Afghanistan has, since 2001, strongly emphasized that all revenue and tax 
income is to be channelled through the Ministry of Finance in Kabul, allowing them to keep 
track of income and to ensure a distribution of funding in compliance with their national 
strategies and priorities. Although that income is low, as most development funding is 
provided by external donors, the principle remains important to the Government of 
Afghanistan as it enables them to maintain a degree of authority and allows for prioritization 
of funding to areas untargeted by international donors.26 A GoA official insisted that, at this 
stage of development of the Afghan state and governance system, it was premature to discuss 
any further utilization of income from natural resources in the provinces/districts where these 
were extracted. That would only, from his point of view, cause further conflicts and increase 
the tension between the central government and the provinces and between provinces. 
 
                                                     
25 The corruption allegation was referred to an unnamed US official in a Washington Post article in November 
2009, available at  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34116888 
26 A 2009 report from the Afghan Ministry of Finance document that as much as 77 % of the international 
development funding is channeled outside of Afghan government control. 
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Interestingly, none of those interviewed argued that more locally generated income should 
only be utilized in their part of Afghanistan.  Emphasis was rather placed on ensuring such 
income for the Government and people of Afghanistan. What was of concern locally and 
among Parliamentarians, however, was to ensure local job generation, development of 
infrastructure and possibilities for local businesses to be drawn on, and the potential for 
Afghan investment in profitable industry opportunities.  
 
It might be re-stated at this stage that the literature review points out that, at least in Africa, 
decentralisation has largely “not succeeded in establishing conditions for more efficient or 
equitable use or management of resources, including resource revenue”, but rather, “can 
become a new battleground with potential negative effects both on the prevalence of 
corruption and on social justice.”    
 
4.  Attitudes towards neighbouring countries and the international community 
 
There is a very strong distrust expressed by all Afghan interviewees towards their 
neighbouring countries, but particularly towards Pakistan given their longstanding 
involvement with and military and financial support for Afghan political parties and groups.   
 
One parliamentarian expressed frustration about developments in Afghanistan in the 
following way:”We can’t trust our police, we can’t trust our army and if we neither can trust 
the international community, then what is the meaning of life here?” 
 
It became evident early in the interview process that the Parliamentarians were concerned 
about the Hydrocarbons bidding process. Several politely pointed out that the “political 
situation is not ready to use this source (oil and gas)”, and another that “this has to be done at 
the right time, and until now the region is not secure enough, and there are other elements 
involved that makes our situation worse…”.  
 
One, however, expressed his concern more directly, and set the other more careful comments 
into perspective: “This process is about management of our national resources. We have 
learned that it is a Pakistani company that has provided a bid – that is not acceptable to us 
from a national security prospect”.27 
 
This knowledge coupled with a perceived Norwegian influence on the bidding process was 
then probably what prompted the following remark from another MP from the north:   “I 
appreciated the Norwegian involvement in Afghanistan until for about 6 months ago when I 
realized they were interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Norway has to know the 
population, and has to understand the politics – now they are taking side in internal matters. 
He then went on to state that “But, we still acknowledge that Norway are professional in the 
practical handling of oil and gas.” 
 
The perception about the Norwegian role is important to take note of, as it appears to be based 
on a lack of knowledge of the actual involvement and function of Norwegian consultants and 
advisors in this process. That has left some with a perception, based on a general negative 
experience of foreign interference (and a lot of circulating rumours), that Norwegians have 
influenced the Afghan decision making process in this case.  
 
5. National utilization of natural resources 
 
The above touches on another key finding: the unison opinion that Afghan oil and gas 
resources must be utilized within Afghanistan.  Moreover, all interviewees argued that these 
                                                     
27 The company referred to is Orient Oil. It is an international company with main office in the United Arab 
Emirates, though perceived by Afghans interviewed to be influenced by Pakistani shareholders. 
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resources should be used for the benefit of all Afghans. They regarded it a common national 
resource, where the use and income generated was not to be limited to Afghans living in the 
provinces where these resources are extracted and/or refined.  That argument was also made 
by the political party Junbush-e Milli that, in effect, could control most of the present oil and 
gas fields. 
 
Many thought that the available Afghan resources were limited compared to what was already 
in production in neighbouring countries. Their opinion was therefore that there would not be 
any major demand for Afghan oil and gas resources in neighbouring countries should 
Afghanistan wish to market these for sale abroad.  
 
A further argument made was that Afghanistan was at the moment spending far too much on 
purchasing energy from abroad, and far too little on developing and utilizing its own natural 
resources, such as water and gas for energy production. A frequently expressed concern was 
that they had become economically dependent upon their neighbours and their donors for 
their energy supply. 
Security 
Turning to the questions posed in the ToR, the security aspect is discussed in detail above 
with the main finding being that the security situation in northern Afghanistan is stable but 
still unpredictable. The present tension between Governor Atta and the Kabul Government, 
internal unresolved differences between ethnic groups and Taliban’s gradual reestablishment 
in the north are all contributing to short term unpredictability. The possibility that the US 
might start reducing their military presence and development support from 2011 onwards 
might add to the internal tensions.     
 
A question that was pursued throughout the interviews was if uncertainty about the security 
situation could have been the reason why only one company had entered into the 
hydrocarbons bidding process. None of those interviewed believed that security concern was 
the main reason. They attributed it rather to the following: 
 
 Uncertainty about how large the deposits were. 
 The political crisis that had developed following the Presidential elections. 
 Opening up of new fields in Iraq where resources were better documented. 
 
One opinion presented in north Afghanistan related to financial security for potential 
interested companies “…one of the reasons that national and international companies are not 
interested to invest their money is lack of transparency in governmental policies and 
procedures, everybody asks for a share and percentages” 
 
From a more technical perspective, USAID mentioned that the sequencing of the bidding 
process might have prevented some companies from entering. The present system does not 
provide the company that explores and finds the oil/gas resources any guarantee that they will 
be selected for the further extradition and utilisation of these resources.  
 
The indications received by the Norwegian consultants engaged in the process was, however, 
that several companies did not submit a bid due to uncertainty over the local market for gas, 
and that consortiums were excluded from bidding. Many Afghan companies were interested 
in participating in the bidding round together with international companies, but were excluded 
as it was decided by the Ministry of Mines that consortiums were not allowed to bid.   
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View of local authorities, potential for local involve-
ment 
There is strong support among appointed and elected local authorities for development of the 
Afghan gas and oil industry, and for national use of these resources for the benefit of all 
Afghans. Their strong scepticism towards neighbouring countries, their questioning of the 
intentions of the international community and their distrust in the Afghan government, 
strengthen their resolve to control the use of these resources and prevent its sharing beyond 
Afghanistan.  
 
There is, however, an equally strong acknowledgement that Afghanistan lacks the skills, 
knowledge and financial means to develop these resources on its own. They see the need to 
bring in and make use of international companies, but as several interviewees mentioned: “it 
has to be an honest company”, and another that: “we are not certain that companies from our 
neighbouring countries have sufficient knowledge, we will be more satisfied with a western 
company.”  
 
Local involvement would depend on being informed about plans and procedures, which 
seems lacking at the moment, and for initiatives from the Ministry of Mines and other 
government bodies to engage with local authorities. However, potential donors to such 
processes and projects would be advised to develop an information strategy together with 
Afghan authorities to ensure accurate information flow, including the use of media to reach 
broad segments of the public. 
 
The possibility for local investments in the oil and gas industry was mentioned by many 
interviewed, summarized here in a suggestion from a provincial council member: “…we have 
companies that can invest in projects. It would be very good with a conference with Afghan 
traders to see if they might be interested in investing here, either individually or as a 
consortium. It would moreover be beneficial with collaboration between the Ministry of 
Mines and the Ministry of Commerce.”  
 
Contacts made within the Afghan business community supported the idea of establishment of 
an investment consortium for Afghan oil and gas industry, provided that the process was 
transparent and handled in a professional manner. 
Gender dimensions, women rights and involvement 
Many of the women interviewed emphasized the importance the use of gas and electricity 
would have for their health and how it could help improve how they organize their household 
duties. One reflected that “gas would take less time to cook the food, but using the electricity 
help keeping the kitchen clean.” 
 
It was felt that decisions on oil and gas issues were made by men, and only to a limited degree 
were the concerns and interests of women taken into consideration. Several of those 
interviewed explained the challenges they faced in being heard within the council, or in just 
being allowed to the meetings in one province: “… the head of the Provincial Council is 
saying that we women should not sit with the male members at the same table”.28 The 
Ministry of Women Affairs and female members of the Provincial Councils interviewed were 
                                                     
28 These female council members were told that they did not need to attend the meeting scheduled with the team as 
it was only “men’s business” to be discussed. 
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not informed about the Hydrocarbons bidding process or the potential for improvement of 
their livelihoods or establishment of jobs and business opportunities.  
 
Women interviewed thought that if the project was implemented, it would be “one of the most 
fundamental and beneficial initiatives for all Afghans.”  They were advocating the potential 
for job generation and opportunities for small business establishment in connection to the 
development of an Afghan oil and gas industry. Several mentioned that in northern 
Afghanistan there are a number of Afghan women that can contribute both in management, 
leadership and the more technical aspects of the oil and gas industry as they have obtained 
such education. They noted also that development of this sector “will allow women to invest 
in small businesses as producing of jam, sauce, candies/cookies, industries that now lack 
energy.”   
 
When being informed about the process and the potential for utilization of these energy 
resources, their main concern was that they as women would not be allowed a voice or an 
influence on these processes. A female member of a provincial council phrased it as follows: 
 
Unfortunately we have a centralized governance system, the laws, regulations, 
concepts and budgets are developed in Kabul then they arbitrate to how 
implement the decision. The central government decides for us without 
knowing the context here. All the key actors are nationalists and anti women, 
these actors are linked with economic mafia to dominate and monopolize the 
power, they do whatever benefits them the most.   
 
This view was shared by a female parliamentarian, stating that “To ensure the benefit of 
women we need a fair government that can distribute equally between Afghans and between 
men and women. Job employment is needed, and women need to be involved.”  
 
Bringing up the corruption issue, the Ministry of Women Affairs (MOWA) argued for women 
to be appointed to senior positions as they have not so far been involved in corrupt practices 
and are in general “more honest and willing to struggle against corruption”. While this 
argument has less support in the literature on gender and corruption it is worth noting as a 
potential avenue for developing anti-corruption attitudes within the Afghan population.29 
Acknowledging their limited knowledge about this specific field MOWA suggested that the 
Ministry of Finance should check and analyse energy projects from a gender perspective, to 
ensure the involvement of and benefit for women. Their concern was that “Afghanistan is a 
male-dominated country; all projects are designed according to men’s ability. Giving the lack 
of transparent processes women don’t get into higher positions”. 
 
To counter corruption, women suggested that the Parliament and the Provincial Councils 
could act as monitors for the implementation of the Hydrocarbons Law, and for a steering 
committee, including women, to be established to supervise the bidding process, oil/gas 
exploration, income collection and distribution.  
Regional factors; potential for energy transfer 
While there was a noted reluctance against exporting Afghan gas and oil resources due to the 
energy deficit in Afghanistan, there was a positive attitude towards Afghanistan becoming a 
hub for regional energy transfers. Many regarded this as either a possibility for revenue 
generation or a potential, as mentioned for the Turkmen-Pakistan gas pipeline, for Afghan use 
of gas from this pipeline.  
                                                     
29 The U4 Helpsdesk Expert Answer, The State of Research on Gender and Corruption, offers further insight into 
this debate, available at: http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=206  
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The potential for regional use of electricity production based on gas deposits was not 
considered high. The argument being that a) the priority should first be for use within 
Afghanistan, and b) except for Pakistan and India other states in the region would likely 
prioritize making use of their own gas-resources for electricity rather than import it from 
Afghanistan.    
 
A noted concern was the international and regional politics involved in the “international 
struggle for the control of the black gold”, and Afghanistan’s lack of agreements with 
neighbouring states on natural resource management. Afghans feared that they would have 
only limited influence on these processes, and, again, that personal financial benefits might be 
prioritized over national interests.   
Coordination of energy initiatives 
A general concern for the development of the energy sector was, as a major donor noted, that 
at the moment “there are too many cooks in the kitchen”. This is supported by a report from 
the Office of the Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction which points out that 
Afghanistan lacks an updated masterplan for the energy sector. The report refers to statements 
from ADB and WB officials when they warn that “…many current activities in the energy 
sector are ad hoc and not managed in a strategic manner”.   
 
That stated, the assumption recorded is that the donor coordination mechanism established for 
the energy sector is functional. 60 donors are meeting on a monthly basis at the Ministry of 
Economy (MoE), and a part of their task is to identify gaps in donor funding. USAID is 
providing the MoE with the secretariat for this coordination function.  
 
The conclusion to draw from these observations is that further initiatives are needed to 
improve the coordination effort. This should include the development of a new overall master 
plan for the energy sector and more specific coordination efforts for the gas and oil sector, 
where it would be beneficial to involve all relevant Ministries, including the Ministry of 
Finance and also the IDLG. A further improvement would be if they ensured frequent 
communication with the Parliament and Provincial representatives. A Ministry of Finance 
official alluded to this in a statement on what they regarded as their limited involvement in the 
Hydrocarbons bidding process: “There is the division of responsibilities between ministries, 
and a number of issues, where we could have been consulted to ensure the best possible 
outcome for Afghanistan, I can just mention taxation, revenue distribution…”. 
 
This would meet the concern noted in the literature review (section 1.1.) for “informal and 
formal opportunities for consultation, engagement and participation”, as a way to improve 
project success.  
Main conclusion 
Major progress has been made in the development of the capacity and technical expertise of 
the Afghan Ministry of Mines to develop a Hydrocarbons Law, getting it approved by the 
Afghan Parliament, and in running the first Hydrocarbons bidding process. It was a setback 
that only one company submitted a bid, and that this bid then was rejected in April 2010 by 
the evaluation committee. However, Afghanistan now has legislation in place for the 
management of natural resources that might be of key importance for the further development 
of Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Mines holds expertise and experience from managing 
international bidding processes.  
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All documentation underlines the economic importance for Afghanistan of the development 
and national utilization of their oil and gas resources, and there is growing evidence that 
increased use of gas for domestic consumption and energy production (together with hydro-
power) might contribute positively to reduce threats to the environment. 
 
That stated, this research and the literature review have identified a range of risks and 
challenges to the further process that Norad is advised to reflect on in their further planning.  
 
The security situation is stable in northern Afghanistan, but there is an increased risk for 
instability if the internal political balance is changed or/and the relationship between local 
power-holders and the GoA is altered. The potential withdrawal of US and international 
forces from Afghanistan from 2011 onwards might increase security unpredictability.   
 
There is moreover a notable risk emerging from the high degree of mistrust that is 
documented between the central and local governance levels, not least relating to the 
utilization of natural resources and securing/distributing the income from these. Suspicions of 
corruption and fear that information might be withheld for the purpose of personal gain are 
widespread. The immediate “lootability” of the oil and gas resources might be less than for 
other natural resources, but accusations made with regard to the Aynak process indicate that if 
processes are not transparent and tightly guarded “looting” might take place in the preparation 
phase rather than after extraction has taken place.  
 
Such a distrust of intentions is not only limited to other Afghan actors, since most Afghans 
express a high level of suspicion about the motives and intentions of neighbouring countries 
and, increasingly, also of the international community. Afghanistan has a rumour mill that 
frequently exploits such mistrust to further its own political positions by claiming undue 
intensions, interference and failures on the side of international actors. Coinciding with major 
economic, strategic and military interests among regional and international actors, the 
utilization and potential for distribution of income from Afghan hydrocarbon resources is 
likely to continue to be a politically contested theme.  
 
With the lack of an updated masterplan for the energy sector there is a high risk that the 
internal/external coordination of projects and efforts in this sector might be driven by the 
interests of single actors, Afghan and international, rather than towards a clearly defined set of 
goals. The urgency for documenting progress might then come to override sound longer term 
planning. 
 
That stated, it must be noted that there appears to be agreement among Afghans that oil and 
gas reserves are national property, to be used for the benefit of all Afghans and not groups in 
particular areas or individuals holding key positions.  
 
What remains a concern is that many Afghans point out the risk of a lacking political 
willingness to ensure that such benefit will have a fair distribution and that a framework will 
come in place to monitor the process and income distribution. That includes women that are 
generally concerned that they risk being kept outside processes and decisions that might 
influence their development potential. 
 
It is moreover of note that the Afghan oil and gas industry has existed and been in production 
since the mid 1980s. It has been able to maintain a degree of production and professional 
workforce within the Afghan Gas Company and within the Ministry of Mines, while 
continuing to educate new professionals to maintain the present technical installations. The 
risk here is that their knowledge and skills do not necessary match the upcoming requirements 
for further development within this sector, and that, as noted by Minister Sharani, there is a 
need for development of policy and organization, not only technical skills. 
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Recommendation 
Balancing the notable achievements that have come in place through Norwegian facilitation 
and support for the Government of Afghanistan with the range of risks identified in this 
report, and not least the two central conflict issues identified in the literature review, Norad is 
advised to consider the following:  
 
Await further engagement on policy matters relating to implementation of the Hydrocarbons 
Law and a new (if materializing) Hydrocarbons bidding round until there is further clarity as 
to how the Government of Afghanistan aims to develop and utilize these resources and to 
what extent major external donors support such policies. 
  
However, in the meantime consider to provide, upon request from the GoA, the following 
assistance that at the moment entails fewer risks while also addressing major challenges and 
needs in the wider energy sector:  
 
 Advice on the political/diplomatic process of negotiating agreements for utilization 
and division of underground natural resources (and water) with neighbouring 
countries.  
 
 Assist in training and development of Afghan technical expertise in oil and gas 
exploration, production and management, aiming at ensuring that both the Technical 
Faculty in Jowzjan and Afghan Gas Company has the required skills and capacity to 
meet present and future needs in this sector. 
 
 The further development of the hydro power and alternative energy sector, where 
smaller investments throughout Afghanistan might be of larger benefits and smaller 
risks (including on security) that the involvements in the oil and gas sector might 
include. 
 
 Be active in providing information about past and present Norwegian involvement in 
the energy sector, including in local languages and in multiple media channels. 
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ANNEX I: Terms of reference 
Conflict study Afghanistan in relation to oil and gas exploration in Northern 
Afghanistan 
 
Background 
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) is engaged in capacity 
building and technical support to Ministry of Mines in Afghanistan. A part of the task relates 
to make commercial use of gas and oil reserves in Shebergan through an international bidding 
process. Norad, through the Energy-department (ENA) is responsible for the continued 
follow-up of this collaboration, in dialogue with the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul. The work 
is implemented by Econ Poyry (project management and technical support), Arntzen de 
Besche (judicial matters) and Gaffney Cline Associates (commercial support). The capacity 
building is led by Petrad. 
 
A utilization of the petroleum resources in Afghanistan might have positive effects locally, 
nationally and regionally.  A local conversion of the gas to electricity and power transfer to 
Kabul is one of the alternatives under consideration. Estimates of available gasreserves 
indicate a possible generation of 1000 MW for 25 years, or 500 MW for 50 years. This might 
make possible an extensive electrification of northern Afghanistan, and electrical supplies to 
the mining industry in Aynak and Hajigak, A 100-150 MW plant for gas power is under 
consideration by USAID, and ADB is considering an upgrading of the gasfields. The 
development of the coppermine in Aynak includes a coalpower plant. 
 
Gas-export is another possibility, possibly in combination with other alternatives. The 
solution to be selected will depend on the size of the reserves and production capacity. The 
development will affect both central and regional actors in Afghanistan. 
 
CMI conducted for Norad in 2008 an assessment of potential conflicts related to extraction of 
hydro-carbons in Afghanistan. CMI recommended to follow closely the political 
development, and for a more detailed follow-up study at a later stage. 
 
Since this report was presented we have seen a deteriorated security situation in northern 
Afghanistan, at the same time as the presidential elections and change of government has 
made the political situation in Afghanistan more unpredictable. 
 
Study outline 
The development in north Afghanistan, and relations between the northern areas and the 
central administration will be an important element of the study. In addition to the roles of 
General Dostum, Governor Atta and President Karzai the study should include an analysis of 
relations between uzbek and other ethnic based political and military organizations as 
Jumbesh-e Milli and the Northern Alliance, and the Central Government. More generally it is 
desirable to have a better and more comprehensive assessment of actors and development 
scenarios in light of the conflicting interests between the central government, regional actors. 
It is desirable to set Sherbergan in a national energy perspective, and clarify the division of 
roles between different actors within energy development in Afghanistan. (The need for 
strengthened coordination is considered as major). 
 
The study should address division of income between regional (district and province) and 
central authorities, and what influence the Provincial Councils and the Parliament has on 
decisions of income division. And, what plans that are developed by the Independent 
Directorate of Local Governance – IDLG in this connection, or what reflections they might 
have on such an approach to such a challenge.  
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Other issues to be addressed: 
 
 Views of local authorities on oil and gas extraction, possibly what initiatives might be 
important to attract local interest. Local authorities to be consulted should include 
both elected and appointed representatives, and provincial representation of some 
ministries. 
 An assessment of what initiatives that can be implemented to secure a larger focus on 
the gender dimension, inclusive women rights and involvement. 
 Security situation in northern Afghanistan, and consequences for an oil and gas based 
industrial development particularly in Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pol. 
 Possible regional factors of importance for an assessment of the possibilities and the 
conflict potentials, as the initiative to lay the ground for energy transfer from Central 
Asia to South Asia through Afghanistan. 
 Potential for regional use of electricity production based on gas deposits and a 
mapping of relevant challenges in this connection. 
 
It is desirable that a representative from the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul can take part in 
some of the interviews for to contribute to increased learning and knowledge sharing. The 
team is expected to make their own interview appointments. 
 
Time-schedule and organizing the study 
The deskstudy, datacollection and interviews in Oslo and preparation for interviews in Kabul 
and the fieldwork is expected started in January 2010. The field research is tentatively 
planned for January/February 2010, data analysis and report writing in March and submission 
of final report by end of April 2010. It is acknowledged that the implementation must be 
adjusted to actual security situation in Afghanistan. Norad must immediately be informed 
about any delays. 
 
Implementation 
The study is to be implemented as a mix between a desk and field-study, with and 
international/afghan team project team.  It is desirable with a team of minimum 2 
international consultants, and where local Afghan competence is drawn on to the extent 
possible. The fieldvisit should be undertaken by international and national consultants. It is a 
prerequisite that one of the afghan consultants is a woman. CMI hold the responsibility to 
enter contracts with local partners. 
 
A final lists of interviews is to be developed but it should include the Norwegian Embassy in 
Kabul, central Afghan Ministries and departments, international organizations and possibly 
embassies from some of the neighboring countries. 
 
In northern – Afghanistan should the interviews include Governors, members of Provincial 
Councils and single ministries as well as representatives from the UN, ISAF and NGOs in the 
Jowzjan and Balqh provinces. The security situation might necessitate that some of these 
interviews are undertaken by afghan consultants. The results of the interviews in northern- 
Afghanistan shall if required be discussed with central actors in Kabul. 
 
The report shall be in English and of no more than 30 pages, excluding annexes. The report 
will be submitted electronically. 
 
Those taking part in the fieldvisit in Afghanistan shall have necessary first aid training and 
knowledge on how to handle the security situation. It is a premise that also local consultants 
are sufficiently secured. It is understood that CMI has its own emergency plan and a 
permanent crisis team to handle eventual risk situations. A thorough assessment of the 
security situation in Kabul and northern Afghanistan is to be undertaken with the afghan team 
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members and used for the planning of travels and stay. Advice shall be sought from the 
Norwegian Embassy in Kabul. All team-members shall have an insurance covering war risks.   
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ANNEX II: Interview list 
       NAME    LOCATION  POSITION 
   
  Mr. Petter Stigset  Oslo  Senior Advisor, Norad 
  Mr. Petter Bauck  Oslo  Senior Advisor, Norad 
  Mr. Shahrani   Kabul   Minister of Mines 
  Mr. Amirzadah Khosti   Kabul   Head of Department  MoFA 
  Mr. Enayatullah Nabiel  Kabul   MoFA 
  Ms. Muzghan Mustafawi  Kabul   Deputy  Minister,  Ministry  of 
Women Affairs 
  Ms. Shafiqa Noori  Kabul   MP, Head of Committee for Natural 
Resources and Environment 
Protection  
  Ms. Ghulalai Noor Safi  Kabul   MP, Balkh Province  
  Mr. Rahman Oghli  Kabul   MP, Faryab Province  
  Mr. Baz Mohammad      
        Jowzjani 
Kabul  
   
MP, Jowzjan Province  
  Mr. Nawandish   Kabul   Mayor of Kabul  
  Mr. Faizullah Zaki   Kabul   MP, Jowzjan Province  
  Ms. Kristin Hauge  Kabul  Councellor, Norwegian Embassy 
  Ms. Siv Kaspersen  Kabul  Councellor, Norwegian Embassy 
  Mr. Abdul Haq Shafaq   Faryab   Governor of Faryab 
  Mr. Rahmatullah  Faryab  Head, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Latif   Faryab   Member,  Provincial Council  
  Mullah Mohd Nabi  Faryab  Member, Provincial Council  
  Mr. Muhibullah   Faryab   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Ghulam Sakhi Naweed   Faryab   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Saed Farukh shah Jinab   Faryab   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Mr. Mohd Ebrahim  
       Teenmas  
Faryab   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Abdul Ghani Nasrat   Faryab   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Angar Tokhi   Faryab   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Faqeer Mohd   Faryab   Member, Provincial Council 
  Ms. Rahima Baihaqi  Faryab  Member, Provincial Council  
  Ms. Durtaj  Faryab  Member, Provincial Council 
  Ms. Sharifa Azimi  Faryab  Head, DOWA 
  Ms. Salima Ormal  Faryab  Head. Dept. of Labor and Social 
Affairs 
  Ms. Nooria Fikri  Faryab  Head, Law Department MOWA 
  Ms. Anisa Zaray   Faryab   Program coordinator AWEC 
  Ms. Muloda  Rahimi   Faryab   DoWA  
  Ms. Rezagul  Faryab  DoWA 
  Ms. Atifa Karwani   Faryab   Gender mainstreaming Manager 
DoWA 
  Ms. Rabia Hashemi   Faryab   DoWA 
  Ms. Maliha  Faryab   Teacher 
  Mr. Nusrat  Faryab  Teacher 
  Mr. Azizullah   Faryab  Shopkeeper 
  Mr. Mohd. Hashim Ahpari  Faryab  NCA, Head of Field Office 
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  Ms. Susan Wintelow  Faryab  NRC, Head of Provincial Office 
  Ms. Saliha  Faryab  NRC, Programme Coordinator 
  Mr. Mohd Samim Faryab   Faryab   CHA 
  Eng. Mohd Tawoos   Faryab  CoAR 
  Eng. Mateen Rasikh  Faryab  SDO 
  Eng. Daoud Bakhshi   Faryab  ADA 
  Mr. Mohammad Hashim   Faryab  AWSDC 
  Mr. Ahmad Zaman  Faryab  NC 
  Mr. Mirwais   Faryab  NPO 
  Mr. Hashim Zareh  Jowzjan  Governor of Jowzjan 
  Mr. Abdul Qadir Malia  Jowzjan  Deputy Chair, Provincial Council 
  Ms. Nabiya Mustafazade   Jowzjan  Member, Provincial Council 
  Ms. Faradeba  Jowzjan  Member, Provincial Council 
  Eng. Salaam  Jowzjan  Geologist, Dept. of Hydrocarbons  
  Eng. Abdul Rahman  Jowzjan  Head, Afghan Gas 
  Eng. Hussain  Jowzjan  Afghan Gas 
  Eng. Fateh Mohammad  Jowzjan  Afghan Gas 
  Eng. Abdul Ghani  Jowzjan  Afghan Gas 
  Eng. Nazar Mohammad  Jowzjan  Head, Hydrocarbon Survey Dept. 
  Eng. Habibullah  Jowzjan  Geologist, Dept. of Hydrocarbons 
  Eng. Hassan  Jowzjan  Geologist, Dept. of Hydrocarbons 
  Eng. Mohammad Afzal  Jowzjan  Technician, Afghan Gas 
  Eng. Mohammad Ayub  Jowzjan  Head, Pipelines Afghan Gas 
  Ms. Zahar Arib   Jowzjan   Head of DoWA 
  Ms. Hakima Adil Afzali   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Fatima Niazi   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Roeda   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Semeen   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Roshan   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Shakiba  Jowzjan  Head, Dept. Refuges and 
Repatriation  
  Ms. Fauzia   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Nooria   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Nelufar   Jowzjan  DoWA 
  Ms. Nafisa   Jowzjan  UN Habitat (trainer) 
  Ms. Fahima  Jowzjan  Deputy, CDWAO 
  Ms. Dilaram   Jowzjan  Household  
  Ms. Nadira   Jowzjan  Household  
  Ms. Frishta   Jowzjan  Doctor   
  Ms. Tamana   Jowzjan  Doctor 
  Dr. Mohd Afzal Hadid   Balkh   Head, Provincial Council  
  Mr. Akhlaqi   Balkh  Deputy, Provincial Council  
  Ms. Mahjoba Sadat   Balkh   Member, Provincial council  
  Ms. Rababa Naebi   Balkh  Member, Provincial council  
  Mulawi Mutawakil    Balkh  Member, Provincial Council  
  Haji Mohd Khan   Balkh   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Azizullah Khan   Balkh   Member, Provincial Council 
  Mr. Khaliq Bae   Balkh   Member, Provincial Council 
  Abdul Latif Khan   Balkh   Member, Provincial Council 
  Ms. Fariba Majeed   Balkh  Head of DoWA 
  Mr. J.R. “Dick” Dumford  Kabul  USAID, Head Energy Groups 
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  Mr. John Smith‐Sreen  Kabul  USAID, Division Chief, Energy and 
Water 
  Ms. Nina Nadiradze  Kabul  USAID, Deputy Division Chief 
  Mr. James E. Gilmore  Kabul  USAID, Project Manager – 
Environmental 
  Mr. Mahmood Mir  Kabul  USAID, Senior Energy Advisor 
  Mr. Mohammad Yasin  
        Osmani 
Kabul  General Director, Office of 
Oversight for Anti‐Corruption 
  Mr. Qaseem Ludin  Kabul  Deputy Director, Office of 
Oversight for Anti‐Corruption 
  Mr. Saifullah Abid  Kabul  MoF, Advisor to the Minister 
 
  Mr. Sigurd Marstein  Kabul  Minister Counsellor and Civilian 
Coordinator,  
PRT Meymaneh 
 
  Mr. Geir Ytreland  Oslo  Consulting Geologist 
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ANNEX III: Timeline work performance 
Main elements in the work performed by the Norad advisory team30 
for the Afghan Ministry of Mines 2007–2010 
 
 
 
Date 
 
Description of work 
Late 2006 
 
MoM requests Norwegian assistance to develop the petroleum sector in 
Afghanistan. 
January 2007 Meetings between the Afghan Minister of Mines Mr. Adel and the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Gahr Støre in Kabul.  
January 2007 Norad commissioned ECON and AdeB to assess whether Norway should 
provide long term assistance to develop the petroleum sector in Afghanistan. In 
addition, AdeB was commissioned to provide short term assistance advising on 
amendments to the petroleum law and regulations.  
January/February 
2007 
AdeB desk studies of the Hydrocarbons Law commenced. 
 
13-26 April 2007 
 
Field trip, Kabul and Sheberghan:  
Main focus of AdeB was on amending the Cabinet approved Hydrocarbons Law 
2005 prior to submission to the Parliament.   
 
Econ on field trip to Sheberghan area to evaluate current installations and 
infrastructure. 
20-30 May 2007 Field trip, Kabul:  
Main focus of AdeB was on amending the draft Hydrocarbons Regulations 
prepared by inter alia the World Bank.  
June 2007  Draft report entitled “Evaluation of the feasibility of providing Norwegian 
assistance to the petroleum sector in Afghanistan” submitted.  
 
The report concludes inter alia that: 
 
“The hydrocarbon resource potential in Afghanistan is significant and if 
extracted can play a very important role in the development of the country. 
Especially the link between gas and power is important. By developing the gas 
resources in the Sheberghan area in Northern Afghanistan, enough gas will be 
available to meet the demand for electricity in the country. A reliable power 
supply is important for economic growth which again will increase the political 
stability in Afghanistan.”  
  
The report further recommends a five element strategy to increase the activity 
level in the petroleum sector in Afghanistan. The strategy entailed:  
 
1) Preparation of a reactivation and production round for the oil and gas fields in 
the Sheberghan/ Sar-i-Pol area  
                                                     
30 Team consisted of representatives from: Econ Pöyry AS, Arntzen de Besche Advokatfirma AS, Gaffney Cline 
and Associates. Project leader: Geir Ytreland. 
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2) Identification of private anchor customers for the Sheberghan gas   
3) Legal assistance to the Ministry of Mines  
4) Launch of the first exploration round in Afghanistan 
5) Capacity building in the Ministry of Mines  
28 July 2007 The intended last draft of the amended Hydrocarbons Law submitted to MoM.  
31 August 2007 First draft of Hydrocarbon regulations submitted to MoM. 
September 2007 
 
Work on amendments of proposed Model PSC commences (first draft prepared 
in connection with a World Bank programme). 
September 2007  Norad requested to prepare a tender round for 4 blocks in Northern Afghanistan. 
 
Work on the first draft of tender documents/compilation and organization of data 
package commenced. 
19 September 2007 Work Shop on Production Sharing Mechanism in Oslo. 
8 October 2007 MoM and MFA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding. 
 
The MoU sets out to provide support to the MoM along two axes; preparation 
for an oil and gas tender round, as well as a more long-term capacity building 
programme for the staff of the Ministry. 
April 2008 Bazarkhami block was dropped from the list of blocks to be included in the first 
tender round. 
2. – 3. April 2008 Work Shop in Kabul on the First Afghan Hydrocarbons Tender Round  
May 2008  Work on harmonization of draft Model EPSC with respect to draft Hydrocarbons 
Law and draft Hydrocarbon Regulations commenced.  
4. – 15. May 2008  Field Trip to Kabul to clarify the progress of the Parliamentary approval process 
of the Hydrocarbons Law.  
June 2008  Revised draft Hydrocarbon Law approved in the Lower House; to be passed on 
to Upper House for approval and to President for sanctioning.  
 
AdeB team field trip to Kabul to review translation of approved law. 
June – July 2008 
 
Final translation of approved Law received and comments on corrections given 
for consideration in Upper House treatment. 
13 July 2008 Norad team in Kabul to discuss bid parameters/Term Sheet. 
16 September 2008 Norad team in Kabul to discuss bid parameters/Term Sheet. 
September/October 
2008 
Updated drafts of Hydrocarbon regulations and Model EPSC submitted. 
27 – 30 October 
2008 
Field trip by Norad team to Kabul to discuss term sheet/bidding round. 
 
Late December 2008 Upper House approves the Hydrocarbons Law. 
 
28 January 2009 The Hydrocarbons Law sanctioned by President Karzai. 
1 February 2009 The Hydrocarbons Law is gazetted in extraordinary issue no 972. 
 
Late February 2009 Norad team meets with MoM in Dubai and finalizes all outstanding issues 
relating to ToR, Model EPSC and a couple of clarifications of new draft 
Regulations.  
17 March 2009 Launch of the first Afghan Hydrocarbons Bidding Round 
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26 April – 15 May 
2009 
Road Show (Dubai, London, Houston, Calgary and Singapore) 
15 May 2009 Data package available. 
15 June 2009 Deadline for Pre-qualification Application. 
 
Late June 2009: Norad team in Kabul to assist in pre-qualification evaluations. 
1 July 2009   Pre-qualification Participants Announcement. 
 
28 July 2009 Bidders Conference, Dubai 
 
15 September 2009  Original deadline for Bids, extended same day, prior to expiry. 
15 November 2009  New bid deadline, 1 bid received. 
23 February 2010  Bid opened. 
14 April 2010 Bid rejected. 
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INdeXINg teRMs
Natural resources
petroleum industry
Conflicts
Risk Assessment
Afghanistan
Norad has been engaged in capacity building 
and provision of technical support to the Afghan 
Ministry of Mines since 2007. A part of this 
engagement relates to the development of the 
Afghan Hydrocarbons Law, and commercialization 
of gas and oil reserves through an international 
bidding process.
The Afghan oil and gas industry has been in 
production since the mid 1980s, but is in need of 
major investments. Afghans interviewed are of 
the opinion that oil and gas reserves are national 
property, to be used for the benefit of all Afghans. 
The review has identified a range of risks and challenges to the further process, and 
Norad is advised to consider:
 
To await further engagement on policy matters until there is further clarity as to 
how the Government of Afghanistan aims to develop and utilize these resources. But 
consider to provide:
• Advice on the political/diplomatic process of negotiating agreements for   
              utilization and division of underground natural resources; 
• Assist in training and development of Afghan technical expertise in oil and gas               
              exploration, production and management;
• Assist in the further development of the hydro power and alternative energy      
               sector.
